The New York Times made the front page of the Munich agreement: “Hitler receives less than his claims from the Sudetenland,” and reports that a “joyful crowd” had applauded Daladier on his return to France and that Chamberlain had been “wildly applauded” upon his return to the UK.  Czechoslovakia was informed by Great Britain and France that it could either oppose Nazi Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexes. The Czechoslovakian government single-purposely acknowledged the desperation of the fight against the Nazis, reluctantly capitulated (30 September) and agreed to abide by the agreement. The colony gave Germany, from 10 October, the Sudetenland and de facto control of the rest of Czechoslovakia as long as Hitler promised not to go any further. On 30 September, after some time off, Chamberlain went to Hitler`s house and asked him to sign a peace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. After Hitler`s interpreter translated it for him, he was glad to have accepted it. The Munich Agreement is rooted in popular memory as a diplomatic disaster and a source of lasting lessons for the future. The political crisis in Britain, caused by Hitler`s ambitions towards the Sudetenland, is much less well known. Yet it was one of the most serious of the century.
He points out that even in times of great danger, politicians will naturally take care of themselves. But it also reminds us to follow closely the interaction between foreign and domestic policy. More often than we can imagine, these two are intertwined. The British people expected an imminent war and Chamberlain`s “state gesture” was initially applauded. He was greeted as a hero by the royal family and invited to the balcony of Buckingham Palace before submitting the agreement to the British Parliament. The general positive reaction quickly re-established despite the royal patronage. However, there was resistance from the beginning. Clement Attlee and labor rejected the deal in alliance with the two Conservative MPs Duff Cooper and Vyvyan Adams, who until then had been seen as a hard and reactionary element in the Conservative party. On 28 September at 10 a.m., four hours before the deadline expired and without the approval of Hitler`s request to Czechoslovakia, the British Ambassador to Italy, Lord Perth, summoned the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr Galeazzo Ciano, to request an emergency meeting.  Perth informed Ciano that Chamberlain had ordered him to ask Mussolini in the negotiations and ask Hitler to delay the ultimatum.
 At 11:00 a.m., Ciano met With Mussolini and informed him of Chamberlain`s proposal; Mussolini agreed and responded by questioning the Italian ambassador to Germany and telling him: “Go immediately to Fuhrer`s house and tell him that I will be by his side, but that I ask for a 24-hour delay before hostilities begin.